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A new scientific truth does not triumph by convincing its 
opponents and making them see the light, but rather 
because its opponents eventually die.    
     (Max Planck, 1949:33-34.) 
 
Abstract 
When “paradigms” differ: scientific communication between 
skepticism and hope in recent philosophy of science 
The first half of this article illustrates how contemporary hu-
manist philosophy of science got caught up in a gradual loss of 
confidence concerning the possibility of sound communication 
among scholars holding on to different paradigms or presuppo-
sitions. The second half is dedicated to the responses provided 
by a Christian school of philosophy to the bleak possibility of a 
communication crisis. The resources deployed by the reforma-
tional school of philosophy are argued to constitute valuable 
instruments to create a more hopeful attitude towards scientific 
dialogue. A final note is dedicated to the possible causes of the 
difficulties experienced in this area of reflection by contem-
porary humanist philosophy of science. 
When “paradigms” differ: scientific communication between skepticism and hope ...  
Opsomming 
Wanneer “paradigmas” verskil: wetenskaplike kommunikasie 
tussen skeptisisme en hoop in hedendaagse 
wetenskapsfilosofie 
Die eerste helfte van hierdie artikel skets die prentjie van he-
dendaagse humanistiese wetenskapsfilosofie wat toenemend 
verstrengel raak in ’n verlies aan selfvertroue oor die moontlik-
heid van substansiële kommunikasie tussen wetenskaplikes 
wat tot verskillende paradigmas of vooronderstellings behoort. 
Die tweede helfte bestaan uit die reaksies van ’n denkskool in 
die Christelike filosofie oor hierdie troostelose moontlikheid van 
’n kommunikasiekrisis. Die bronne wat die reformatoriese filo-
sofie aanwend, so word geredeneer, stel waardevolle instru-
mente beskikbaar om ’n hoopvoller houding tot die wetenskap-
like dialoog te skep. ’n Finale afdeling brei uit oor die moontlike 
oorsake van die probleme wat hedendaagse wetenskaps-
filosofie in hierdie denkarea ondervind. 
1. Introduction, problem statement and plan of action 
Humanist science started with considerable confidence in the pos-
sibility of communication among scientists. The works of Galileo 
often contained words like dialogo or discorso in their titles.1 Com-
munication was a precious possibility, often taken for granted both in 
philosophy and in science. It was one of the elements that granted 
credibility and legitimacy to science. How did it happen that even the 
possibility of scientific dialogue is questioned in the most recent 
philosophies of science? The latter can be considered as the main 
question of this article, together with a second one: What response 
could be offered, from a reformational point of view?  
In the first part of this article (Sections 2-5), the gradual move 
towards skepticism concerning the possibility of scientific com-
munication in contemporary philosophy of science is analysed. After 
a survey and description of this gradual process the possible re-
sources are indicated that might help counteracting the present 
tendency towards relativism and pessimism. The philosophers ana-
lysed below are among those who offered the most relevant 
contributions, in the twentieth century, to the issue of the difficulties 
                                      
1 See for example Galileo’s Dialogue concerning the two chief world systems 
(1632) and Discourses on the new sciences (1638). Also in the title of his 
Sidereus nuncius the idea of communication is pre-eminent. 
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of scientific dialogue among rival or competing schools in the va-
rious disciplinary fields.  
The historical survey will start from Karl Popper, a philosopher who 
still maintained a considerable dose of optimism about the possibility 
of communication. This will provide a frame of reference against 
which the subsequent loss of confidence and the adoption of more 
pessimist and relativist views will become more apparent. 
2. Popper’s relative optimism: communication must be 
possible 
The possibility of communication is mostly just taken for granted in 
Popper’s work. If science is characterised by the proposal and 
critical evaluation of theories, it must be possible to communicate 
even among scientists of different persuasions. Of course he dis-
cussed the philosophies of several skeptics and irrationalists, but for 
Popper the negative consequences (for science) of their positions 
spoke for themselves.  
On the other hand, Popper did not simply appropriate the positivist 
approach. The positivists had been looking for a kind of neutral 
language, a scientific language capable of eliminating the problems 
implicit in ordinary language (the latter in fact harboured non-
scientific and “metaphysical” notions). Along the same line, they ten-
ded to identify verifiability with meaningfulness: linguistic statements 
that are non-verifiable do not have meaning. Popper, however, 
softened this hard-line: statements and theories can be non-scien-
tific without necessarily being “meaningless, or nonsensical” (Pop-
per, 1963:38-39).  
It is only with the appearance of the works of Kuhn that the issue of 
incommunicability is faced with particular attention (and with a 
certain irritation) by Popper. He realises that here is a fundamental 
issue at stake, namely the “myth of the framework”: the conviction 
that ideas can be debated only if certain basic assumptions are 
shared. Those who don’t know or don’t share the framework (he 
refers explicitly to Kuhn’s paradigms), cannot be told about the 
theories and the facts generated by the framework. Popper has no 
doubt that such an approach is wrong. It is a form of relativism, 
actually the central bulwark of relativism (Popper, 1970:56). 
To him, the whole issue boiled down to “transforming a difficulty into 
an impossibility” (Popper, 1970:56-57). Accepting the metaphor of 
translation, he asks: “Is it not true, that concepts and ideas can al-
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ways be translated into English, for example from Chinese or Hopi?” 
(Popper, 1970:56). 
For Popper the gap between old and new theories is always relative. 
They are both footsteps in the way towards the approximation of 
truth. Also the gap between different generations of scientists and 
between rival “schools” remains relative. We are still capable of 
appreciating the theories of Newton, Galileo or Kepler. Their points 
of view can be fully understood. 
3. Realising the difficulties of communication:  
Michael Polanyi 
3.1 The beginnings of Polanyi’s career 
In Science faith and society (Polanyi, 1946), at the beginning of his 
career, Polanyi’s attitude is quite close to Popper’s. At that time Po-
lanyi recognises the existence of several types of pre-scientific pre-
suppositions and frameworks, but he highlights the fact that all 
scientists share those ideals and “premisses”; therefore the scientific 
communities show a high degree of consensus, and communication 
is never doubted. This attitude may be called the “conservative line” 
in Polanyi’s philosophy (Coletto, 2007:74, footnote 53). Although this 
“line” continues to be presented in Personal knowledge (1958:205, 
220, 222), a second “line” of thought emerges quite clearly, a line 
that may be called “late-modern” (Coletto, 2007:74, footnote 54). 
3.2 Developing a “late-modern” line 
Following Polanyi’s new approach one learns that the frameworks 
behind science can indeed be very different from each other. In-
stead of creating a common ground they often create controversies 
(see e.g. the controversies on fermentation or hypnotism) which are 
only apparently centered “on questions of factual evidence” (Polanyi, 
1958:167).  
The attitude is quite different from the one pervading Science faith 
and society. In this publication scientific thinking seems to be 
“locked up” within a certain framework. It is difficult to criticise our 
own frameworks because they all have an “epicyclical structure” 
supplying subsidiary explanations in difficult situations (Polanyi, 
1958:291). According to Polanyi: 
They have power to control our thought. They speak to us and 
convince us, and it is precisely in their power over our minds 
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that we recognize their justification and their claim to universal 
acceptance. (Polanyi 1958, 265.) 
And 
No intelligence, however critical or original can operate outside 
such a fiduciary framework. (Polanyi, 1958:266.)  
It is not possible, says Polanyi, to “prove” that our basic beliefs are 
reasonable, logical, or even acceptable. While the acceptance of a 
basic framework is the condition for having any knowledge, the 
framework itself can claim no self-evidence. Our basic beliefs are 
indubitable only in the sense that we believe them to be so. Our 
liberation from objectivism, according to Polanyi, is therefore to 
realise “that we can voice our ultimate convictions only from within 
our convictions” (Polanyi, 1958:267). 
All this has immediate consequences for the possibility of scientific 
dialogue: the latter cannot be taken for granted anymore. According 
to Polanyi, formal operations relying on one framework of inter-
pretation cannot demonstrate a proposition to a person who relies 
on another framework. Those who support a certain framework may 
not even succeed in being understood by the supporters of a 
different one, because “they must first teach them a new language” 
(Polanyi, 1958:151). Even the new “language” cannot be learned 
without a previous “decision” (by the audience) to accept the new 
hypothesis with sympathy. It is not just a matter of proving some-
thing scientifically or rationally. 
Proponents of a new system can convince their audience only 
by first winning their sympathy for a doctrine they have not yet 
grasped. (…) Such an acceptance is (…) to this extent a 
conversion (Polanyi, 1958:151).  
Such “conversions” divide the community of the scientists. Polanyi 
uses the language of religious experience when speaking about 
“disciples forming a school, the members of which are separated, for 
the time being, by a logical gap from those outside it. They think dif-
ferently, speak a different language, live in a different world” (Po-
lanyi, 1958:151-2; italics – RC). 
3.3 Polanyi’s contribution: towards an assessment 
The relationship between the conservative and the late-modern line 
could probably be interpreted in many different ways. What could be 
considered as a series of contradictions by someone, can be re-
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garded as a dialectical unity by a more sympathetic reader. There 
can be a different answer to the question whether the two lines 
integrate each other, constitute an unresolved tension, or are even 
necessary to each other. In general, we can say that Polanyi pro-
vides a system which is more open than Popper’s to the recognition 
of the difficulties of communication in science.  
The philosophers to be analysed in the following sections welcomed 
especially the “second line” of Polanyi’s philosophy in their own 
systems of thought. In the following section the contribution of Kuhn, 
who was a student of Polanyi and explored the important notion of 
incommensurability will be analysed, commencing with an assess-
ment of his views of communication in The structure of scientific 
revolutions. 
4. Kuhn and incommensurability 
4.1 Radical views in The structure of scientific revolutions 2
Compared to Polanyi, the possibility of communication is more pro-
blematic for Kuhn. In The structure, the prevailing paradigm provides 
on the one side the common ground for communication between 
adherents of the same paradigm. On the other side it is almost im-
possible (at least considering some of Kuhn’s statements) to com-
municate with scientists who do not accept the same paradigm. 
Fortunately, according to Kuhn, only one paradigm can dominate a 
certain field of study in a certain period. This preserves a consider-
able degree of communication. The problem of communication 
rather arises in times of crisis, in transitional periods, when revo-
lutions divide the scientific community between an old and a new 
generation. 
For example, Kuhn (1970a:109) says that two scientific schools “will 
inevitably talk through each other when debating the relative merits 
of their respective paradigms”. Looking at the history of science, one 
of the most striking examples of incommensurability, according to 
Kuhn, is the famous debate between the French chemists Proust 
and Berthollet. Proust claimed that all chemical reactions occurred in 
fixed proportions, while Berthollet stipulated that they did not. “Each 
collected impressive experimental evidence for his view. Never-
                                      
2 From now on: The structure 
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theless (…) their debate was entirely inconclusive” (Kuhn 1970a: 
132).  
“During revolutions” says Kuhn (1970a:111), “scientists see new and 
different things (…). We may want to say that after a revolution 
scientists are responding to a different world. (…) what were ducks 
in the scientist’s world before a revolution are rabbits afterwards”. It 
is not only the perspective that changes, but the phenomenal world 
itself. Kuhn wishes to say that “after Copernicus astronomers lived in 
a different world” (Kuhn, 1970a:117), and after discovering oxygen 
“Lavoisier worked in a different world” (Kuhn, 1970a:118).  
All this has important consequences for communication. “Before 
they can hope to communicate fully one group or the other must 
experience the conversion (…) a transition between (…) competing 
paradigms cannot be made a step at a time, forced by logic and 
neutral experience” (Kuhn, 1970a:150). How then are scientists 
brought to make this transposition? Kuhn simply answers that in fact 
“they are often not” (Kuhn, 1970a:150). He reminds the reader that 
copernicanism made few converts for almost a century after 
Copernicus’ death. Such examples could be multiplied.  
However, Kuhn’s position contains many nuances and uncertainties. 
In the section that follows the “softening” of his radical views after 
The structure will be considered. 
4.2 The further development of Kuhn’s views on scientific 
communication 
The “softening” of Kuhn’s radical views on communication started 
already within The structure (cf. Kuhn, 1970a:129, 130, 150), es-
pecially in its Postscript. There scientists seem to be again able to 
listen to each other, at least in some sense. The stimuli that impinge 
upon them are the same, says Kuhn, and their “general neural appa-
ratus” is the same. They share a history and in addition both their 
everyday experience and most of their scientific world and language 
are shared (Kuhn, 1970a:201).  
In his further development Kuhn somehow narrowed and limited the 
concept of incommensurability. During the 1960s the incom-
mensurability of two theories touched three aspects:  
• differences in the phenomenal world;  
• differences in the selection of problems and standards for their 
solution; and  
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• differences of meaning.  
At the end of the 1960s and beginning of 1970s the first two aspects 
were abandoned and incommensurability focused only on change of 
meaning (Kuhn, 1970b:267-268). In addition, Kuhn specified that his 
incommensurability thesis never implied that all concepts change in 
the transition to a new theory (e.g. Kuhn, 1970b:267, 269). There-
fore two theories were now called incommensurable when there is 
no “language into which at least the empirical consequences of both 
can be translated without loss or change” (Kuhn, 1970b:266). This 
language would be a neutral observation language, but there is no 
such language. 
Kuhn’s further re-elaboration of the concept at the beginning of the 
1980s insists on the notion of translation. The argument concerning 
a neutral observation language disappears and untranslatability is 
involved in explaining incommensurability. “If two theories are in-
commensurable they must be stated in mutually untranslatable 
languages” (Kuhn, 2000:34). Here Kuhn has in mind translation in 
the narrow, technical sense (Kuhn, 2000:40) which consists in 
replacing single words (or groups of words) by words available in the 
target language. As this type of difficulties generate only “local 
incommensurability” Kuhn (2000:35-37) declares that “the claim that 
two theories are incommensurable is more modest than many of its 
critics have supposed” (Kuhn, 2000:36). 
The “taming” of incommensurability requires the adoption of two 
other important ideas. The first one is that incommensurability does 
not imply incomparability (Kuhn, 1979:416). As a consequence (and 
this is the second idea) there remains a continuity between different 
traditions of normal science. The empirical potential of incommen-
surable theories can indeed be compared. Such theories have 
empirical interconnections. There must therefore remain a certain 
type of continuity even between incommensurable theories (Kuhn, 
2000:36). 
Kuhn gradually reduces and limits some of the radical claims he 
presented in The structure. This move seems to recover Polanyi’s 
“conservative” line and is much appreciated by many recent com-
mentators and contributors who feel much more at ease with Kuhn’s 
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latest conception of incommensurability and are determined to build 
on it.3  
4.3 Kuhn between dialogue and incommensurability  
The latest development of Kuhn’s thought shows that the gradual 
move towards relativism of contemporary philosophy of science is 
not simply a linear process. It is a process that knows pauses and 
even contradictions. Nevertheless, it should also be acknowledged 
that Kuhn takes a step further from where Polanyi was. In Kuhn’s 
works incommensurability, according to Kuhn, becomes an esta-
blished concept, entailing a potential threat to communication and to 
the legitimacy of science. This is certainly one of the reasons why 
Kuhn sometimes seems to hesitate. In order to maintain the cre-
dibility of science he tries to indicate a few possible antidotes to 
complete relativism. These hesitations, however, were abandoned 
by Feyerabend, who accepted the challenge of relativism and plu-
ralism and even welcomed them as the basis of his philosophical 
system.  
5. Feyerabend and beyond: incommensurability, 
celebration and anxiety 
5.1 Incommensurability, language and worldview 
It can be said that Kuhn and Feyerabend are very similar in their 
reflection on incommensurability, yet Feyerabend reaches a more 
radical position. The theme of incommensurability is introduced, in 
Against method, as something that anticipates the future radical 
character of philosophy of science. He admits that times are not 
completely mature to propose his anarchist approach, “that is liable 
to paralyse the brains of almost everyone” (Feyerabend, 1975:214). 
                                      
3 According to Xiang Chen (1997:257-273) Kuhn’s latest version of incom-
mensurability is an attempt at reducing relativism. The same author argues that 
incommensurability can be only a “local phenomenon” and does not necessarily 
imply incomparability (Xiang Chen, 2003:962-974). On the contrary, says Xiang 
Chen (2002:1-21), even so-called incommensurable taxonomies can be 
rationally compared. Hoyningen-Huene (2002:61-83) points out that even 
Feyerabend, towards the end of his life, re-evaluated in more positive terms 
Kuhn’s latest pronouncements on incommensurability. Sankey (1998:7-16) 
would even like to rescue Kuhn from anti-realism and to show that his latest 
version of incommensurability is compatible with a solid “scientific-realist 
framework”. Newton-Smith (1981:102-107), a staunch defender of scientific ra-
tionality, remains a bit more ironic: in his view Kuhn started as a “revolutionary” 
and gradually became a “social democrat”. 
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On the other hand, one can already try to “anticipate the next stage”. 
In fact, incommensurability is already here: we don’t need to wait for 
the next scientific revolution. Kuhn may not realise it, but rival 
schools and paradigms have been proliferating and co-existing in all 
disciplines.4 Incommensurability has to do with the “covert class-
ifications” implicit in every language (Feyerabend, 1975:214). 
Later Feyerabend provides another definition of incommensurability: 
Let us call a discovery, or a statement, or an attitude in-
commensurable with (…) a theory, [or] framework if it suspends 
some of their universal principles. (Feyerabend, 1975:269.) 
With these declarations, Feyerabend switches the focus from lin-
guistics and translation to the worldviews, principles, beliefs and on-
tological convictions supporting these theories. The linguistic issues 
are not simply abandoned, but Feyerabend is convinced that state-
ments and theories are dependent on some fundamental framework. 
When the basic assumptions of such a framework are denied (“sus-
pended”) by another framework or by statements or by a new 
theory, the two competing systems become incommensurable. 
Feyerabend dedicates a long section to establish the fact that 
incommensurability exists, perhaps feeling that Kuhn’s work was not 
decisive on this point. His arguments refer to studies on children’s 
perception (Feyerabend, 1975:227 ff.), but also to different styles in 
painting (Feyerabend, 1975:230 ff.). Analysing the Greek archaic 
style, Feyerabend outlines the basic view of the world underlying 
such painting. Without entering into the details, it can be said that, 
according to Feyerabend, the cosmology implied in these paintings 
is incompatible with our modern conception of the world and of man 
(Feyerabend, 1975:230).  
When this happens in science, it is not possible to institute an ex-
periment which will refute one of two theories (Feyerabend, 1975: 
282). It is also not possible to find a neutral position from which it 
would be possible to compare for example the theory of relativity 
and classical physics (Feyerabend, 1975:275-76). It is an illusion 
even to suppose that incommensurable theories deal “with the same 
subject matter”. This view is born from the wrong supposition that 
facts can be relatively independent from theories, but there are no 
                                      
4 For example, in physics Feyerabend (1970:207-208) notices the presence of 
three competing schools after 1860, which means at least three paradigms 
acting simultaneously on the scene of physical science.  
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facts without theories. Therefore, incommensurable theories deal 
with totally different facts.  
Does all this mean that communication between scientists, in such 
cases, is simply impossible? The answer must be positive, to a large 
extent, though according to Feyerabend it is still possible, for ex-
ample, to refute incommensurable theories. It is not possible to do 
this by comparing their respective content. They can, however, be 
refuted by discovering their internal contradictions. Feyerabend ad-
mits that in the absence of commensurable alternatives “these 
confutations are quite weak, however” (Feyerabend, 1975:284), and 
“greatly reduced in strength” (Feyerabend, 1975:285). Although 
incommensurable theories are not totally immune to criticism the im-
pression is that with Feyerabend the point is reached of a loss of 
communication. Feyerabend wanted to use the arguments of 
rationality in order to undermine rationality itself (Feyerabend, 1975: 
33). The impression is that he also uses communication to prepare 
for a breakdown of (scientific) communication. 
5.2 Baudrillard: towards a postmodern implosion? 
With Feyerabend the possibility of incommunicability finally becomes 
a real challenge. This challenge is accepted, in postmodern times, 
with an attitude which is a mixture of celebration and anxiety. Bau-
drillard cannot avoid being concerned. 
Though communication within scientific circles is not the primary 
focus of his criticism, it is included in his general analysis of repre-
sentations, reproductions, hyper-reality, et cetera. In his view 
science and technology have caused the implosion of communi-
cation in general, exactly by exploiting its possibilities. His later 
works are especially dedicated to the media, but earlier he had con-
ducted a thorough analysis of language and communication 
(Baudrillard, 1981). 
According to Baudrillard (1984:129) in our epoch we have entered 
the “third order of simulacra”, which is an order of simulation and is 
“controlled by the Code”. Communication becomes mis-information 
and invades both public and private space. What is left is only 
“obscenity”, in the sense that all is “transparency and immediate 
visibility when everything is exposed to the harsh and inexorable 
light of information and communication” (Baudrillard, 1984:130). This 
leads to “a state of terror, proper to the schizophrenic: too great 
proximity to everything” (Baudrillard, 1984:132). It leads especially to 
“the loss of the real” (Baudrillard, 1984:133).  
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Communication was supposed to constitute the real, but exactly 
through its reproductions it has created the hyper-real, which is just 
a simulation without origin or relation to any reality. Technology and 
the media are certainly to be blamed for this, but the media at least 
share their responsibilities with misguided science and technology. 
Science has not only experienced the “internal” difficulties of com-
munication, but has also prevented the possibility of true commu-
nication in contemporary society.  
5.3 Celebrating dissensus: Jean-Francois Lyotard 
Admittedly, not all voices are as pessimistic as Baudrillard’s. Lyo-
tard, for example, invites one to stop longing for a science in which 
consensus is one of the most important values. According to 
Lyotard, postmodern science should not seek to create consensus, 
but rather dissensus. In his view, Habermas’ philosophy of consen-
sus obtained through dialogue,5 is based on the meta-narrative of 
emancipation (Lyotard, 1984:60). According to Lyotard (1984:65), 
Habermas is wrong in identifying emancipation and consensus. 
Consensus is only a particular state of discussion, not its end. Also 
Lyotard believes in the necessity of emancipation, but hopes to 
achieve it via the power of dissensus. Consensus can be the end of 
freedom and of debate. It is dissensus that allows the experience of 
liberation. 
In Lyotard’s view of science dialogue and communication do have a 
legitimate place, but it does not matter whether they are “effective”, 
in any traditional sense. Actually, it is better if such dialogue doesn’t 
reach any result, if consensus is avoided: this will keep the game 
going. Postmodern science, in his view, can open up new and ex-
citing perspectives exactly by resisting consensus.  
It is now time to consider the responses to the pessimistic views on 
the possibility of scientific communication provided by reformational 
philosophy. 
                                      
5 Habermas’ philosophy of communication and rationality (cf. Habermas, 1984), 
constitutes one of the moments in late-modern philosophy in which the general 
drift towards the loss of communication has been resisted. 
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6. Reformational responses 
6.1 Dooyeweerd on “antithesis” 
With Dooyeweerd the problem of communication is not related only 
to the natural sciences but to the “humanities” as well, as the latter 
acquire full scientific status in his philosophy (as well as in more 
recent reformational scholars – cf. Strauss, 2001). Dooyeweerd is 
sometimes accused of having insisted too much on the impact of the 
“antithesis” in theoretical thinking, especially (but not exclusively) 
concerning the conflict between Christian and non-Christian scholar-
ship (cf. Klapwijk, 1986:138-142). However, this antithesis in Dooye-
weerd’s (1959:70-72) view, was not supposed to constitute an ob-
stacle to the dialogue between scientists of different persuasions. 
There is an equilibrium in his position, which is the result of a double 
acknowledgment in his epistemology. On the one hand he recog-
nises the importance of ground motives, which indeed create a diffe-
rence in the interpretation of creational data. This is true for philo-
sophy as well as for the special sciences. On the other hand, 
Dooyeweerd acknowledges the reality of the order for creation 
(Dooyeweerd, 1959:72-73) constituting a common ground among 
scientists and thinkers.  
In this respect it is interesting to mention that Dooyeweerd’s second 
way of transcendental critique (Dooyeweerd, 1984, 1:22-57) begins 
from the structure of theoretical thought, which is a common ground 
for all thinkers. The issue of the “antithesis” is introduced only in the 
third and final “step” of his critique. It is also interesting to notice that 
Dooyeweerd’s critics had strong differences of opinion in the evalua-
tion of his idea of antithesis. For authors like Wolterstorff (1989:64-
65) or Klapwijk (1986:141-143), Dooyeweerd’s view of antithesis 
was too radical. In their opinion the dooyeweerdian idea of antithesis 
would divide the scientific community and hinder the cooperation 
among scholars. For others, however, the dooyeweerdian idea of 
antithesis was too weak. 
The critiques by Cornelius Van Til (1971:99), for example centered 
on the impression that the theme of the religious6 antithesis was not 
                                      
6 In the present context the adjective religious may create some perplexity. In 
reformational circles it does not refer only to Christianity or to the “classical” 
religions. It is possible to speak of the religious convictions (in the sense of the 
ultimate commitments) of humanists, atheists, positivists, Marxists and all those 
who “interpret” life in some way or the other (i.e. all human beings). According to 
Roy Clouser “a belief is religious provided that (1) it is a belief in something(s) or 
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sufficiently emphasised by Dooyeweerd. According to the famous 
apologist of Westminster Seminary, Dooyeweerd should not have 
started his critique from supposedly neutral states of affairs (Van Til, 
1971:99). Dooyeweerd’s reply was that although he wanted to re-
cognise the relevance of the religious antithesis, the states of affairs 
are founded in the cosmic law-order, not in any subjective con-
sciousness, and therefore they are accessible to all thinkers, irre-
spective of their orientation (Dooyeweerd, 1971:80-81). 
No matter what the convictions of the scientist are, according to 
Dooyeweerd she/he will have to deal with laws and structures that 
are not simply dependent on his/her views. By “states of affairs” 
Dooyeweerd did not indicate a reality simply disconnected from 
mankind, a reality that could, as such, provide the basis for scientific 
communication. His view of naive experience does not wish to imply 
a naive realistic conception of reality (Dooyeweerd, 1984, 3:34). This 
is even more the case with theoretical thought.7  
Nevertheless, Dooyeweerd believes that when the creational data 
are neglected or interpreted incorrectly, theoretical thought itself will 
end up in antinomies and contradictions (Dooyeweerd, 1959:74). 
The views of the different scientists therefore, both in philosophy 
and special science, are not considered “incommensurable”. Crea-
tion itself is the judge of our theories and it will continue to remain a 
normative source for all knowers (Dooyeweerd, 1959:72). It is pre-
cisely this intuition and acceptance of a created order which seems 
to be missing from humanist philosophy. This created order, on the 
other hand, seems to be accepted much more naturally by Christian 
systems of thought.8 In the following section reference to some 
                                                                                                              
other as divine or (2) a belief concerning how humans come to stand in proper 
relation to the divine”. Divine, according to Clouser should be defined as “having 
the status of not depending on anything else” (Clouser, 1991:22-23). 
7 On this point Dooyeweerd had important discussions with the Dutch philosopher 
C.A. van Peursen, who does not recognise the existence of states of affairs. He 
only recognises dynamic events and affairs that do not “stand”, but are also 
constituted by the interaction with the knowing subject. (cf. Van Peursen, 1959).  
8 The idea of a structural order is of course not exclusive to reformational circles. 
Troost (1994:2-16) demonstrates that the theme of a “creation order” has been 
present in Christian thinking from the patristic era up to the present. However, 
Troost (1994:8-16) also points out that in the Christian tradition this crucial idea 
has often been worked out especially from a theological perspective and has 
been shaped rather naively from a philosophical point of view. As a con-
sequence, many types of alien influences (e.g. stoicism, neo-platonism) have 
been welcomed into various Christian conceptions of the creation order, thus 
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other themes of Dooyeweerd’s contribution will be made, while their 
connection to his Christian worldview will be pointed out. 
6.2 Dooyeweerd on scientific dialogue 
According to Dooyeweerd the religious antithesis does not magically 
divide the scientific community into two well-delimited groups. This 
antithesis cuts through the life of the Christian scientific community 
as well as through all other communities (Dooyeweerd 1984, 1:524). 
Scientists, who are Christians, sometimes adhere to unbiblical 
ground motives when it comes to science and apart from that, they 
are still under the influence of the fall. In addition, the religious 
ground motive is of course not the only reference point for scientific 
knowledge (Dooyeweerd, 1959:69). Creation is the God-given com-
mon denominator. Therefore the “states of affairs” can be dis-
covered by all. 
As a consequence, Dooyeweerd firmly believed in the possibility of 
communication and even cooperation between scientists of different 
persuasions. He looked forward to a “healthy and noble emulation” 
between all philosophical schools (Dooyeweerd, 1959:73; trans-
lation – RC). Christian scholarship is not bound to an oppositional 
attitude. The challenge for all schools of thought is to provide a 
reliable account of creational data, not jealously to defend their own 
views.  
Dooyeweerd believed in the possibility of real dialogue, and his 
transcendental critique was intended to promote this dialogue.9 He 
contended that it is exactly the “dogma” of the autonomy of theo-
retical thought that caused genuine dialogue to be impossible. The 
different schools, in his opinion, were not sufficiently aware of the 
deeper causes of their disagreements, which are often related to 
different ground motives. Once these motives are uncovered, it 
should be easier to come to a more open comparison of ideas and 
theories (Dooyeweerd, 1959:71). 
There was for Dooyeweerd, a common call that was directed to all 
scholars and scientific communities. This view was a consequence 
                                                                                                              
preventing a more original Christian contribution in both catholic and protestant 
thinking. 
9 Of course there are, on this point, different evaluations of Dooyeweerd’s endea-
vour. See for example the doctoral thesis of Conradie (1960) and the recent one 
by Choi (1999). 
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of his Christian worldview. Notwithstanding the apostasy of human-
kind, God’s cultural mandate to humanity is not cancelled. All 
scientists are exposed to the same risks and called to the same 
task. Even apostate thought contributes to the “fulfilment of the 
Divine plan” (Dooyeweerd, 1984, 1:119). In the present era it is not 
possible to gather the “faithful servants” (of the parable of the ta-
lents) in a separate “school” (Dooyeweerd, 1984, 1:524). It is the 
common task that imposes the necessity of humility and dialogue.  
Admittedly, the different schools see things differently. This diffe-
rence, however, does not cancel the reference to creational data. 
Dooyeweerd’s classical example centers on the proposition 2+2=4 
(Dooyeweerd, 1959:72 ff.). Numerically speaking, the judgment 
2+2=4 corresponds to a state of affairs which is independent from 
every subjective theoretical view. Yet a difference of interpretation is 
manifested between the different currents of the philosophy of 
mathematics. The logicist tendency is thus opposed to the intui-
tionist, the formalist, the empiricist or to the sensualist tendency.  
The conflict among interpretations is certainly real. However, ac-
cording to Dooyeweerd, the structural order for the temporal horizon 
of experience, with all the states of affairs which are founded on it, is 
indubitably the same for every thinker, irrespective of the orientation 
of one’s thought. Once they are discovered, the structural facts 
impose themselves on everybody and it would make no sense to try 
to deny them. All schools and currents of philosophy receive the 
common task of accounting for them in a philosophical way. These 
schools are inter-dependent, and must learn from each other. The 
philosophy of the cosmonomic idea, says Dooyeweerd, does not 
claim any privileged position among the other philosophical schools 
(Dooyeweerd, 1959:73). 
It seems quite clear that the theme of a religious antithesis, as far as 
Dooyeweerd is concerned, does not cancel the possibility and ne-
cessity of dialogue. On the contrary, to discover this antithesis is the 
starting point to realise a meaningful dialogue. “Dialogue and anti-
thesis”, as the title of Choi’s (1999) thesis reads, go hand in hand in 
Dooyeweerd’s view.  
6.3 Different levels: implications for dialogue and framework-
dependence of theories 
Reformational philosophy, according to Dooyeweerd, does not 
“attribute to its provisional and fallible results the infallible character 
of its religious starting point” (Dooyeweerd, 1959:73). This repre-
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sents another extremely important theme of the dooyeweerdian 
view. The only radical kind of antithesis is the religious antithesis 
(Dooyeweerd, 1984, 1:123). Other forms of antithesis are therefore 
relative. When speaking of incommensurability in science (and the 
same holds for antithesis) we must distinguish between the level of 
the deepest presuppositions and the level of the concrete theories. 
There is a definite difference between the two. In Dooyeweerd’s 
words, the Biblical religious motive is believed to be infallible by the 
Christian, but his own scientific theories can only be regarded as 
provisional and fallible.  
The point is quite important: by confusing or by not distinguishing 
properly the different levels, some philosophers of science tend to 
attribute the same degree of incommensurability to the starting 
points as well as to the theories. If the dialogue is not possible on 
the level of the deepest convictions, it cannot be possible at any 
other level, they would argue. There are of course differences be-
tween the different authors10 but Feyerabend definitely shows a 
tendency to declare theories incommensurable because their pre-
scientific frameworks are incompatible.  
A sound distinction between different levels of presuppositions and 
scientific research (e.g. Duvenage, 1985:31 ff.)11 would allow for a 
more nuanced position. It is true that there is always a connection 
between presuppositional frameworks and concrete theories, a 
connection which is sometimes not immediately visible yet never-
theless real (Wolterstorff, 1976:79). The framework, however, does 
not completely determine the theories. The latter are not simply the 
                                      
10 In some cases (see Kuhn’s paradigm) the frameworks are constituted by 
elements that belong partially to the scientific and partially to the pre-scientific 
level. As a consequence the framework itself can be regarded as partially 
scientific. In this case, from a dooyeweerdian point of view, the hypothesis of 
incommensurability simply becomes more remote because complete “antithesis” 
is not plausible at the scientific level. 
11 According to Duvenage’s account of scholarship, three levels of scientific 
investigation should be recognised as different but connected to each other 
(Duvenage, 1985:31-36). He proposes the image of a spiral, in which we can 
distinguish three “levels” that are called: microfocus, mesofocus and macro-
focus. In each level relevant “perspectives or visions” are found (Duvenage, 
1985:33). “These visions cohere directly with the various levels which can be 
distinguished in the formation of science.” (Duvenage, 1985:33.) In every level, 
Duvenage distinguishes both scientific and pre-scientific “perspectives”. In this 
way he recognises both the different assumptions and the common engagement 
of all scholars with the debates and theories of a certain field of study. 
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product of the presuppositions of the scientist (Van Riessen, 1992: 
90). There is therefore a difference between the levels, and also a 
relative “independence” of theories from presuppositions of various 
depth and nature. This situation allows for a certain degree of com-
munication. 
Comparison and dialogue are thus possible not because of the exis-
tence of a neutral language, or because scholars can enter a neutral 
position outside their paradigms (positivism), or because the para-
digms are rooted in a common ground (Polanyi’s early writings), but 
because presuppositions are not decisive in a final sense and we 
live in a common (though not neutral) world. In the long run, the real 
world resists our reductions and distortions. 
This entails another important implication for scientific dialogue: 
even our fundamental frameworks can be criticised and evaluated. It 
might be impossible to compare two religious motives in abstract. 
Even in this case, however, according to Dooyeweerd (e.g. 1959) 
their influence on theoretical thought can be observed and we can 
criticise each other. When one realise, for example, that one’s philo-
sophy and science are full of absolutisations, of reductionism and of 
consequent antinomies, one has a clue about the problematic nature 
of one’s deepest presuppositions. And this can certainly become a 
relevant topic for a dialogue among proponents of rival frameworks 
and theories.  
Having argued in favour of a relative dependence of theories on 
frameworks and worldviews, in the following section the thesis will 
be defended that even concepts and statements are only relatively 
dependent on the theories in which they appear.  
6.4 Stafleu: relative theory dependence of concepts and 
statements 
Authors like Kuhn, Hanson and Feyerabend have criticised the em-
piricist position and have stressed theory-dependence of concepts 
and statements. In their philosophies, such theory-dependence is 
stressed to such an extent that the meaning of concepts and the 
truth of statements are completely determined by the theory in which 
they function. This implies that, in principle, competing theories can-
not be compared. This constitutes a powerful argument in favour of 
incommensurability. If the basic assumptions of complete theory-
dependence can be shown to be flawed, there is obviously hope that 
incommensurability may be rejected and the dialogue between 
proponents of different views may be placed on more solid ground. 
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In this context one could refer to Stafleu’s (e.g. 1987:26-29) con-
tribution, because he defends the idea of a relative theory-depen-
dence of concepts and statements. Finding his starting point in 
Dooyeweerd’s theory of modalities, he suggests a position that 
“takes a middle course between two more extreme views, logical-
empiricism, and historical relativism” (Stafleu, 1987:28). First he 
clarifies the term intension (= meaning) referred to concepts, and the 
term extension (the number of entities belonging to the class). After 
a short discussion of the concept planet he concludes that “the 
extension of a concept can be changed without changing its inten-
sion”12 (Stafleu, 1987:26). The consequences drawn by Stafleu are 
far-reaching: 
Hence the meaning of a concept is partly determined by its 
theoretical context; it is theory dependent. But its meaning also 
has a certain autonomy with respect to the theory. A similar 
view can be held with respect to statements. (Stafleu, 1987:27-
28.) 
In order to support the relative theory-dependence of concepts and 
statements, Stafleu proposes a second argument, which takes into 
account the theory of modal aspects. Theories, says Stafleu (1987: 
29) have a typical kinematic aspect, deduction being the logical 
movement from one statement to another. Similarly, statements 
have a typical spatial aspect, because they are dominated by the 
idea of connection. The structure of a concept refers to the logical 
unity and diversity, in other words to the numerical aspect of expe-
rience.  
Supposing the numerical, spatial, kinematic and logical aspects 
to be mutually irreducible, we now understand both why con-
cepts and statements are theory dependent, and why they have 
nevertheless an irreducible autonomy. In this structural inter-
lacement the meaning of concepts and the truth of statements 
are both relativized and opened up, if they start to function in a 
theory. (Stafleu, 1987:29.) 
                                      
12 On this specific point it is interesting to compare Stafleu’s approach with Kuhn’s. 
Kuhn (2000:15 ff.) analyses the sentence “in the Ptolemaic system planets 
revolve around the earth; in the Copernican they revolve about the sun”. He 
concludes that “the sentence is incoherent. The first occurrence of the term 
planet is Ptolemaic, the second Copernican, and the two attach to nature 
differently. For no univocal reading of the term planet is the compound sentence 
true” (Kuhn, 2000:15). 
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The target of Stafleu’s arguments is the notion of incommensura-
bility. He wants to propose a middle course between two more ex-
treme views, namely logical empiricism, and historical relativism.13 
One of the fundamental assumptions of logical empiricism was the 
existence of observation statements and concepts independent of 
any theory (Suppe, 1974:14). These were called observation state-
ments and observational (or empirical) concepts. The empiricists 
strongly relied on observation and assumed the possibility of finding 
purely empirical protocol statements, independent of any theory. For 
Stafleu, however, observations cannot take place outside the con-
text of one’s expectations, frameworks and presuppositions in gene-
ral. More in particular, for the observations performed in laborato-
ries, sophisticated instruments are used that are often developed 
according to quite elaborated theories.  
The agreement on the fact that observations cannot be made apart 
from any theoretical context, however, should not blind one to the 
fact that observational results may be quite independent of some 
theories. As an example, Stafleu (1987:29) mentions the occasional 
backward motion of the planets, which played a considerable role in 
Copernicus’ heliocentric theory and was never disputed by any 
astronomer, copernican or not.  
7. Conclusive remarks 
It is time to come to a conclusion. The growing distrust concerning 
the possibility of true scientific communication, culminating in the 
theme of incommensurability have been explored. Also, the alle-
gations that it might not be possible to compare certain standpoints 
or to entertain a dialogue between academic schools holding to 
different presuppositions, have been explored. In the second part of 
the article a few reformational responses have been sketched in 
order to provide an alternative to the dilemmas encountered within 
recent humanist philosophy of science.  
Although the deeper reasons for the different approaches were not 
explored, a hypothesis can briefly be proposed, which implies a call 
for further research on this topic. The ideal of the free creativity of 
the knowing subject (which gradually gained the primacy during the 
twentieth century) constitutes one of the two “poles” of the humanist 
ground motive. The nature-pole, inspiring positivism and leading to 
                                      
13 With this definition he refers e.g. to some of the works of Kuhn, Feyerabend, 
Hesse and others (Stafleu, 1987:28, footnote 34). 
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the idea of “neutral” facts, constitutes the dialectical rival of the 
freedom-pole (Dooyeweerd, 1984, 1:190-495). The freedom-pole 
points towards the existence of totally different frameworks of 
thought, languages, and finally totally different worlds. The common 
ground of a creational order is then rejected in favour of the recog-
nition of a plurality of language games, frameworks and premises.  
The problem is that, in this perspective, the possibility of communi-
cation becomes increasingly more remote. Nowadays humanist 
thinking is attempting to reach a more “moderate” position concern-
ing the possibility of communication (cf. footnote 3). This goal, how-
ever, can only be achieved either by attempting a synthesis between 
the two conflicting poles of the humanist ground motive, or by 
suppressing the “claims” of the freedom-pole altogether. As both 
alternatives are quite unlikely to lead to satisfactory solutions, the 
proposals of the reformational school should be taken into account 
as possible alternatives. 
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